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Abstract
When Monsanto attempted to release transgenic wheat in the upper Midwest of the 
U.S., localization efforts to accommodate stakeholders were unsuccessful. This paper 
explores this break down, focusing on the rhetoric of a group of people who attempted 
to establish protocols that would make co-existence between transgenic and organic 
producers possible. Their goal was to document best management practices that would 
satisfy both parties. The case points to the need for co-existence groups of this kind, but 
also indicates that there is still much we need to learn about negotiating controversial 
technology.
0. Philosophical Implications of Introducing Controversial 
Technology
Philosophers of technology have sometimes characterized technolo-
gy as an autonomous force that has escaped human control, creating 
a reversal, the technological imperative, in which people must adapt 
to technology rather than adapt technology to their own needs (Ellul 
1973: 135; Winner 1977: 229). The worst-case scenarios arising from 
such perspectives prophesy a world in which the technological impera-
tive transforms humans into servants of technology and replaces tradi-
tional cultures with a monolithic technological culture (Huxley 1942). 
Other philosophers and critics of technology argue that technology, as 
the means of production, is ultimately controllable only when people 
in community appropriate the forces of material production as a whole 
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(Marx 1978: 191). The worst-case scenarios arising from these perspec-
tives describe Luddite uprisings doomed to defeat (Vonnegut 1952). 
Although both perspectives may lead to fatalism, it is more often the 
case that people holding either perspective, awakened to critical aware-
ness, band together in their common opposition to technologies they 
perceive as detrimental to human culture or the environment.  Such is 
the case with technologies as widely varied as bio-genetic manipula-
tion of animal and plant life, nuclear power, large swine or poultry pro-
duction technologies, coal-fi red power. In situations in which these and 
other controversial technologies are introduced locally, the technology 
either slips past “sleeping dogs” and is accepted without controversy; 
or, when resistance groups form, proponents and opponents of the tech-
nology tend to fi ght to win rather than to modify the technology or to 
fi nd ways to co-exist with each other. In such cases, local communities 
need to fi nd ways to mediate the technology and the opposing factions. 
In this paper I explore the need for forums in which protocols govern-
ing the release or implementation of new and controversial technology 
can be developed prior to the release. I will get at this issue by telling 
the story of one multi-national company seeking to introduce the tech-
nology of transgenic wheat in the upper Midwest of the United States in 
an area where hard-red spring wheat, used primarily in the baking and 
pasta industries, is grown. 
1. Description of the Case and Players 
Although we normally think of multi-nationals outsourcing production 
to countries where wages are comparatively low, a company may seek 
local production space for other reasons, such as government support 
and producer cooperation, if these factors maximize profi ts. Such is the 
case presently as global seed companies seek farmers who are willing 
to plant and harvest genetically modifi ed (GM), or transgenic, seeds. 
A case in point is that of transgenic wheat in the states of Minnesota, 
South Dakota, and North Dakota. The players in this case are Monsan-
to, a multi-national company and leader in developing and marketing 
genetically modifi ed crop seed; the colleges of agriculture at the Uni-
versity of Minnesota, South Dakota State University, and North Dakota 
State University; the Canadian Wheat Board; local producers (farmers); 
The Dakota Resource Council; and the Northern Plains Sustainable Ag-
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riculture Society. The last two are local groups who have taken on the 
role of resisting the new technology.
1.1. On the Current State of Debate over Food Containing 
Genetically Modifi ed Organisms (GMOs)
There has been a long history of controversy about genetic engineering. 
Craig Waddell’s study of the moratorium in Cambridge, MA, on genetic 
engineering research documents the hearings associated with the issue. 
He analyzes both the logical and emotional appeals employed by those 
who testifi ed before the Cambridge Experimentation Review Board 
(1990). Genetic research and engineering at that time was confi ned to 
the laboratory; in the last decade, however, genetically-modifi ed organ-
isms have spread throughout the environment in the form of genetically 
modifi ed plants. Introduced for commercial production in 1996, geneti-
cally modifi ed corn and soybeans have enjoyed remarkable success in 
the U.S. For instance, Kathleen Hart reports that farmers planted one 
million acres of Roundup Ready soybeans in 1996 and  twelve million 
acres in 1997 (17% of the crop). By 2001, more than 60% of the soy-
bean crop in the U.S. was Roundup Ready (2002: 5). On April 1, 2004, 
The Fargo Forum reported, “Gene-altered soybean varieties are expect-
ed to make up about 83 percent of Minnesota’s crop and 81 percent 
of North Dakota’s [in 2004]” (Zent 2004). Roundup Ready soybeans 
and corn are varieties that have undergone genetic engineering—genes 
from other organisms have been spliced in, making the organism trans-
genic – to create resistance to Monsanto’s herbicide, Roundup. Farm-
ers can plant fi elds of the modifi ed seeds and spray Roundup, eradicat-
ing all plant life except the transgenic plants. Another transgenic corn, 
Bt corn, which has genes implanted in it to kill pests that feed on the 
plant, has also been widely adopted. Brewster Kneen has criticized this 
technology, saying that it produces monocultures that survive only by 
eradicating “their neighbors and co-habitants” (Kneen 1999: 11). Large 
percentages of the corn crop are used for animal feeds or ethanol pro-
duction. A smaller percentage makes it into the human food supply. Al-
though Bt corn has not been approved for human consumption, in 2000 
some Bt corn was accidentally mixed with approved corn and ended up 
in taco shells. When there were several reports of allergic reactions, the 
case brought unwanted publicity to GM production (Hart 2002: 3). De-
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spite this incident, farm production in the U.S. has been a friendly pro-
duction environment for transgenic crops and leads world production of 
GM crops. Farmers in Canada, Argentina, and China have also adopted 
this technology, but their combined production is considerably smaller 
than that of the U.S.
In the U.S., where there is no law requiring that food containing ge-
netically modifi ed organisms (GMOs) be labeled and no law requir-
ing testing for safety of genetically modifi ed food products, the public 
has been largely unaware that genetically modifi ed products have be-
come part of their food supply. In Europe and Japan, on the other hand, 
there has been much debate about, and resistance to, GMOs (Lambrecht 
2001: Chapters 12-14). Alan McHughen, a partisan who supports GM 
technology, has criticized this public debate for being uninformed sci-
entifi cally: “The current state of debate over GMOs, especially in the 
UK, has been of such an appalling standard that, if we had a council to 
referee, all sides would be declared disqualifi ed” (2000: 2). Neverthe-
less, GMOs were banned in the European Union until recently, when 
the ban was replaced with a law requiring mandatory labeling. So, even 
though the public in the U.S. continues to be unaware and uninvolved, 
U. S. farm producers have become very much aware of the controversy 
because of its effects on their global markets. In Europe, although some 
farmers see advantages to themselves if they were to adopt this tech-
nology, they have not adopted the technology because of market con-
straints and environmentalist resistance. 
1.2. The Localization Process for Transgenic Wheat 
Early in 2004, Monsanto announced plans to release transgenic—
Roundup Ready—hard red spring wheat for farmers to plant in the 
spring of that year. This kind of wheat, grown in northern climates, is 
used by the baking industry, so there is a clear connection between the 
wheat in the fi eld and the food on the table. Originally a chemical com-
pany, Monsanto got into the life-sciences business when it saw oppor-
tunity to sell their herbicide in tandem with seed genetically modifi ed 
to be resistant to it. After a relatively small company, Calgene, identi-
fi ed, isolated,  cloned, and patented the gene for resistance to glypho-
sate (the generic name for Roundup), Monsanto invested large amounts 
of money in research and development to perfect their own genetic en-
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gineering methods and their own Roundup-resistant genetic profi le for 
plants (McHughen: 38). The genetic information and the transfer tech-
nology belong to them, and they patent all seed into which they transfer 
their genetic profi le, so that they can collect license fees (Hauck 2004). 
However, crop seeds have been adapted to local conditions all over the 
world by long years of breeding and development; that is, seed varie-
ties are localized. Monsanto’s technology is not localized until it has 
been transferred into a viable seed, and so Monsanto seeks to transfer 
their genetics into seeds that have been developed locally for local con-
ditions. Most wheat varieties (75%) have been developed by land-grant 
universities that produce varieties of wheat suitable for climate condi-
tions (Hauck 2004). These seeds belong to the public—they are not pat-
ented—because they were developed with public funds. Soybean and 
corn varieties, conversely, have been developed in the private sector by 
seed companies like DeKalb and Pioneer and were already patented be-
fore GM technology appeared (Hauck 2004).
1.2.1. A Time-Line Model
The fi rst stage, therefore, of the localization process for transgenic wheat 
was to gain cooperation from local researchers at land grant universi-
ties who had developed local varieties.  Already, at North Dakota State 
University (NDSU) a controlled licensing program, named Roughrid-
er Genetics, had been developed by the University Research Founda-
tion to keep track of licensed materials. The process, then, would be to 
work out an agreement between Roughrider Genetics and Monsanto 
that would permit NDSU to develop and begin to multiply Roundup-
ready local varieties of hard red wheat. Once these varieties were ful-
ly developed, they would be released to seedmen, who would multiply 
them further, developing registered and certifi ed seed to sell to farm-
ers as “Roughrider wheat” (Zetocha 2004). In this case, localization—
Monsanto’s attempt to fi nd local producers—needed to pass from Mon-
santo to local researchers to local seedmen to local farmers, the actual 
producers. If the technology had not become controversial, the proc-
ess of mediating this technology would have been rather straight for-
ward, consisting primarily of creating business contracts, monitoring 
the development and multiplication of the new transgenic varieties, and 
teaching local producers how to work with the new technology.
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In the past, such localization efforts in U. S. agriculture had been 
quite successful: new technology and production methods had diffused 
through the farm economy pretty much as predicted by Everett Rogers’ 
diffusion theory. In the case of hybrid corn a half century earlier, there 
had been early adopters of new seed varieties, who had become agents 
of change persuading other farmers to adopt the new technology (Rog-
ers: 1995). This adoption process has come to be taken for granted be-
cause of the land-grant universities’ success in establishing extension 
services and hierarchies of knowledge. Extension programs are charged 
with bringing the fi ndings of scientifi c research to novices, in this case 
to the farmers, who are expected to adopt the innovations and to place 
their operations on a ‘scientifi c’ basis. Although the extension services 
at many of these universities are beginning to establish a more dialog-
ic relationship with local producers, recognizing that the farmers’ local 
knowledge complements the researchers’ scientifi c knowledge, the tra-
ditional relationship has been unidirectional and asymmetrical, the sci-
entist enjoying the priestly role of expert (Lessl 1989). Mediation un-
der these two models is markedly different. In the traditional expert-to-
novice model, mediation is little more than a transfer of knowledge and 
skill. In the scientifi c-knowledge/local knowledge model, mediation in-
volves discussion and adaptation of new knowledge to local conditions. 
The fi rst instantiates the technological imperative; the second resists it.
When Monsanto approached North Dakota State University about 
developing transgenic wheat, Duane Hauck, Director of the NDSU Ex-
tension Service, felt pressure to buy into the program because the Uni-
versity of Minnesota and South Dakota State University had already 
agreed to do so through unilateral, executive decisions at the top. The 
Dean of the College of Agriculture, Food, and Environmental Sciences 
at the University of Minnesota, Charles Muscoplat, a former Vice Pres-
ident at MGI PHARMA, Inc., a bio-genetics company, was a zealous 
advocate of GM technology. Having recently made the move from in-
dustry to the academy, he was used to making executive decisions and 
handing them down for implementation, and that is what he did in this 
case when he announced that Minnesota would work with Monsan-
to.  Minnesota is considerably larger and more infl uential than either 
South or North Dakota, and so South Dakota State University’s dean 
made a similar executive decision. The introduction of this technolo-
gy and the local licenses promised to produce considerable profi ts for 
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both Monsanto and the universities, an exciting prospect in times when 
there was reduced government support for education. Despite pressures 
caused by neighboring universities’ quick buy-in, Hauck, having been 
approached by concerned members of the Northern Plains Sustainable 
Agriculture Society, felt that it was important to open dialog with vari-
ous constituents in North Dakota and to try to gain consensus before 
entering the agreement. In other words, Hauck had a scientifi c knowl-
edge/local knowledge model in mind for mediating the new technology, 
whereas executives at Minnesota and South Dakota had the traditional 
expert-to-novice model in mind. Eventually, while continuing dialog 
with local constituents, NDSU entered an agreement with Monsanto 
because of fears that NDSU’s breeding program would become defunct 
if varieties of Roundup Ready wheat developed in Minnesota and South 
Dakota took over the market. Hauck said that they needed to buy in to 
remain competitive. At this fi rst stage of the localization process, the lo-
cal situation can be described as being in a state of tension created by 
fear of losing competitive standing on the one hand and concern for lo-
cal constituents on the other. This was, in other words, a situation that 
called for mediation among interested parties.
1.2.2.  Standards Regulating the Release of Genetically 
Modifi ed Wheat
The adoption process needed to be embraced by most of the major play-
ers (universities, researchers, extension agents, seedmen, and large-
scale producers) for it to be successful. If any one geographical sector 
in the wheat-producing area opted out, that area could claim to have 
non-GMO wheat for the market, and wheat from that area would bring 
a premium in Japan and Europe. Transgenic wheat, conversely, would 
be confi ned mostly to domestic markets and would probably bring low-
er prices. Therefore, a cooperative spring wheat program was formed 
among North Dakota State University, South Dakota State University, 
the University of Minnesota, the Western Plant Breeders, and Monsan-
to. This group set standards that regulated the release of the wheat: the 
wheat would not be released until:
1. It received regulatory approvals in the United States, Canada, and 
Japan
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2. Regulatory trade approvals and marketing agreements were in place 
for export markets
3. Grain handling protocols for handling the transgenic wheat were es-
tablished
4. Agreements about how to manage wheat with the Roundup Ready 
trait were established
5. The varieties of wheat developed met standards for end use quality
6. Buyers were identifi ed who would buy and use the transgenic wheat 
(Bringing New Technologies to Wheat).
These standards mapped out several hurdles that needed to be cleared 
if the transgenic wheat were to be released, and required at least the ap-
pearance of full buy-in from all stakeholders. Parts of this process could 
be taken for granted; others posed considerable obstacles. The FDA in 
the U.S. had been very favorable to the release of transgenic seed, and 
so there was little worry about the fi rst standard in the States. The rhet-
oric involved for this standard would consist of producing the appro-
priate documentation, but would not entail mediation. However, Japan 
and Canada were not as clear cut. The second standard posed an ob-
stacle because the European Union and Japan were likely to block im-
ports. U.S. offi cials argued that their resistance was an end run around 
free trade agreements set up by the World Trade Organization. The third 
standard created a requirement for new handling procedures. Produc-
tion and handling practices that would protect against transgenic and 
non-transgenic wheat being mixed during handling and storage need-
ed to be developed and agreed upon. The fourth standard intimates that 
agreements needed to be reached between all producers, including or-
ganic farmers, about how to protect against unintended gene transfer. 
The fi fth standard, meeting end-use quality, would be achieved if Mon-
santo’s genetics could be successfully transferred into local wheat va-
rieties without creating a demonstrable decline in quality and safety. In 
the U.S., the burden of proof is on those who suspect that the product is 
not safe, because if “substantial equivalence,” based on compositional 
comparisons of GM and non-GM crops, can be established, the product 
has traditionally been released without animal or human testing (Mill-
stone, et. al. 1999). Although the issue of ownership and the removal 
of seeds from the public domain did not fi nd expression in the stand-
ards, it was a grave concern because the gene transfer would effectively 
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transfer seed from the public domain to the private, patentable domain 
(DeVore 2004). The sixth would be achieved if large-scale producers in 
the baking industry could be persuaded to purchase and use transgenic 
wheat. This condition was most likely to be met if U.S. policies against 
labeling GM foods could be maintained without consumer protest.
1.3. The Failed Localization Effort
Ultimately, this localization effort failed: Monsanto announced its deci-
sion to withdraw its transgenic wheat early in May, 2004. They did not 
give specifi c reasons for the withdrawal, but people involved with the 
case speculate about the reasons. For instance, Kenneth Grafton, Dean 
of the College of Agriculture at NDSU said, “We had agreed that four 
things had to happen: 1. markets had to be ready, 2. separate handling 
systems had to be in place, 3. regulatory approval in the U.S., Japan, and 
Canada was required, and 4. Canada and the U.S. had to agree to simul-
taneous release of the transgenic wheat. Also Monsanto may have with-
drawn because of potential greater market profi ts in other crops. Total 
acreage of hard red wheat compared to other crops is small” (Grafton 
2004). Brad Brummon, an NDSU extension agent who worked closely 
with stakeholders in the case, suggested that Monsanto withdrew for 
economic reasons, recognizing that they had invested a great deal of 
money on a project that was not being readily accepted. They were 
probably cutting their losses (2005). Janet Jacobson, an organic farmer 
who was active in negotiations about GM wheat, says that she thinks 
Monsanto under estimated opposition from conventional farmers, who 
didn’t think the technology was needed and who worried about markets 
and about yet another Roundup Ready crop making crop rotation dif-
fi cult (2005). Underlying these comments is an unstated acknowledg-
ment that Monsanto withdrew because these standards of release were 
not met. More specifi cally, Canada decided that it would not participate, 
a working group on best practices broke down, a large number of con-
ventional farmers were not convinced that the benefi ts would outweigh 
the potential for lost European and Japanese markets, and the issue was 
beginning to become a public issue for consumers rather than a relative-
ly obscure business negotiation.
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2. A Closer Look at Failed Mediation
A great deal of rhetoric in the form of deliberation, negotiation, and 
public education needed to take place if this technology were to be suc-
cessfully mediated into the cultural and economic context. Most of the 
“rhetoricians” in this case were not professional communicators; rather, 
they were decision makers, consultants, and stakeholders. There were, 
however, some professional communicators involved, namely public 
relations professionals, agriculture extension communicators, and writ-
ers associated with local resistance groups. A research project allowing 
me to describe fully the rhetoric associated with this process, such as 
interactions with the FDA or with the baking industry, would be a much 
larger project than this one. Even describing the readily-available po-
lemic “educational” rhetoric associated this case is beyond the scope of 
this paper. For this paper, I have focused my research on the rhetoric 
of a working group set up through the cooperation of NDSU Extension 
and organic farmers to discuss issues surrounding the organic produc-
ers’ concerns about genetic drift if transgenic wheat were to be released 
for widespread planting. From the perspective of mediating technolo-
gy, this working group would be instrumental in satisfying the third and 
fourth standards for release described above.
2.1. The Formation and Collapse of the Coexistence 
Working Group.
The debate about transgenic wheat was centered in North Dakota be-
cause of its prime location and because of North Dakota State Univer-
sity’s attempt to achieve local consensus rather than to force the new 
technology on the state. They did not ignore petitions received from or-
ganic and conventional farmers, and they did not make executive-level 
decisions without discussion because they knew that there was a strong 
local constituency composed of organic farmers, represented by the 
Northern Plains Sustainable Agriculture Society (NPSAS) and a con-
stituency of conventional producers of hard red wheat suspicious of the 
technology, represented by the Dakota Resource Council (DRC). North 
Dakota is the largest producer of hard red wheat in the country, and it 
has the second largest concentration of organic farmers in the country, 
California being fi rst. Ag Statistics show California at 148,664 organic 
acres and ND at 144,890 acres (Hauck 2004). Most of the organic farms 
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in ND are small family farms, but in California there are large corporate 
organic farms, so the total number of people involved in ND may be 
higher than in California (Hulse 2005). In an attempt to be open, NDSU 
put their policies out on the web in places easy to fi nd (e.g., http://www.
ag.ndsu.nodak.edu/policy/gmo.htm). Furthermore, in an attempt to sat-
isfy local constituents, and responding to NPSAS concerns about genet-
ic contamination of organic seeds and crops, they established a coexist-
ence group, consisting of 18 members drawn from various constituen-
cies (Mattern 2002). Brad Brummon, extension agent in Walsh County, 
worked with Theresa Podoll of NPSAS to  write and receive a Sustain-
able Agriculture Research and Education grant (SARE) from the USDA 
to fund the coexistence group. Originally, the group was composed of 
organic farmers and NDSU representatives, but after the fi rst couple 
meetings, they decided that they needed to widen participation by in-
viting conventional farmers, GM farmers, and Monsanto to the table. 
Monsanto agreed to provide additional money to give release time to 
Brummon so that he could devote more time to the coexistence project. 
Noticeably missing from the mix was representation from the general 
public and from consumer groups.
A professor of sociology from NDSU, Gary Goreham, facilitated the 
group, which was supposed to work together for two years. Brummon 
says that he feared he would lose one of the groups before the working 
group completed its work. He was in an awkward position. Being em-
ployed by NDSU Extension, and being released based on a Monsanto 
grant, but having also been past president of NPSAS, he had to avoid 
potential confl icts of interest. The working group’s original purpose, ac-
cording to the grant, was to explore ways to protect against genetic con-
tamination by identifying issues associated with the potential release, 
writing best management practice protocols, and voting on the proto-
cols (Jacobsen 2004). 
Those representing organic farmers—Janet Jacobson, Theresa 
Podoll, Annie Kirschenmann, and Richard Gross—along with one con-
ventional farmer, Richard Schlosser, who was sympathetic to their po-
sition, pulled out in February 2004 during the voting stage, 18 months 
into the project (Members 2004). They wrote a letter withdrawing from 
the group, claiming that it had failed to address overall objectives of the 
project, and saying: “We will not allow our participation in any way to 
be used as an endorsement of the Best Management Practices produced 
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or any other materials developed as part of this endeavor” (Jacobson 
2004). Janet Jacobson, President of NPSAS, who participated in the co-
existence working group as an Identity Preserved grower (IP), said that 
the organic representatives were frustrated because they were not al-
lowed to propose Best Management Practices (BMPs) that started with 
the words “Producers of GMOs shall . . .” That is, the working group 
would not permit BMPs to be written that singled out and placed re-
sponsibilities on GM producers (Jacobson 2005).  According to Brum-
mon, there was no policy against such wording, but any wording of that 
kind inevitably resulted in the defeat of the proposed BMP (Brummon 
2005). 
Although the working group’s membership had been expanded to in-
clude GM producers and Monsanto, the makeup did not appear to be 
loaded one way or the other, but it turns out that the NDSU representa-
tives voted with the GM side on most occasions. Gary Goreham thinks 
that NDSU representatives voted this way because they “knew which 
side their bread was buttered on” and because they didn’t want to be 
told what kind of research they could do. “For one department head, it 
was a matter of academic freedom” (Goreham 2005). Because BMPs 
that were aimed primarily at GM producers never passed, they never 
made it into the fi nal documentation, and there wasn’t opportunity to 
write a minority position on them. Furthermore, from the organic pro-
ducers’ perspective, the BMPs have no teeth in them because they are 
only suggested best practices and because the wording isn’t specifi c 
enough to dictate responsible action (Jacobson 2005). The technology 
was not mediated to accommodate the concerns of all stakeholders: to 
the organic farming community, the coexistence group’s document was 
an attempt to create the appearance of accommodation when, in fact, no 
accommodation to their concerns was being made.
Recognizing that the votes were producing results contrary to their 
position, organic producers withdrew and concentrated their efforts in-
stead on educating the public and testifying before the state legislature. 
After Karl Limvere, a longtime food activist and minister in the Con-
gregational Church, published a statement titled “A Response to Issues 
and Values Related to Genetically Modifi ed Organisms,” on behalf of 
the Rural Life Committee of the North Dakota Conference of Churches, 
organic farmers enlisted his help in a campaign to get a law passed that 
would give the State Agriculture Commissioner authority to form an 
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advisory committee, hold public hearings, and decide whether or not 
GM wheat could be released in the state (Limvere 2004). This effort, 
known as the “Go Slow with GMOs” initiative required 12,884 signa-
tures to get the issue on the ballot, but it never made the ballot, partly 
because Monsanto announced within a month that they would not re-
lease GM wheat (Springer 2004).
2.2. Documentation of the Coexistence Working Group’s 
Efforts.
The coexistence working group, with the organic producers no longer 
represented, published a document in November, 2004, titled, Suggest-
ed Best Management Practices for the Coexistence of Organic, Biotech 
and Conventional Crop Production Systems. Despite their request in 
the February, 2004, withdrawal letter, names of the organic represent-
atives appear on the document, with a note explaining that the BMPs 
were compiled and voted on in December 2003. There is no indication 
in the document that the organic group had withdrawn prior to publica-
tion or that they did not want their names to be associated with it. Gary 
Goreham explains that they decided to publish the document anyway 
because the organic group withdrew after the votes had been taken. 
He believes that organic producers missed an opportunity because they 
didn’t take the opportunity to write minority opinions for several BMPs 
(Goreham 2005). It was published through the NDSU Extension Serv-
ice, and it acknowledges support from the Cooperative State, Research, 
Education and Extension Service, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 
Nebraska Experiments, and Monsanto. 
The Suggested Best Management Practices document contains a 
brief history of the working group, explains the procedures the group 
followed, lists the participants and date of the vote, and then reports the 
Suggested Best Management Practices (BMPs) as determined by the 
group’s vote. There are thirteen BMPs and a conclusion. Each BMP has 
the same series of headings: Passed (e.g., Passed 9-8); Rationale, ex-
plaining why the issue is important; Majority Recommendation; Minor-
ity Opinion; Sources. Of the thirteen BMPs, the fi rst is the only one that 
is broad enough to address Monsanto, saying researchers and developers 
of regulated genetic material must follow established state and federal 
regulations. Some BMPs are addressed to producers, but the language 
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does not distinguish among GM producers, conventional farmers, and 
organic farmers. For instance, BMP 5 begins, “Producers need . . .” and 
BMP 6, “All producers and truckers should . . .” NDSU is singled out 
in some of the BMPs. BMP 8 recommends that the North Dakota State 
Seed Department “not develop seed certifi cation standards.” It turns out 
that it is no longer possible to certify organic seed lots are 100% free of 
GM seeds because genetic drift in such crops as soybeans, corn, and es-
pecially canola is creating increasing percentages of GM seed even in 
rigorously controlled organic seed lots. Setting certifi cation standards 
would make it impossible to adjust standards as GM contamination in-
creases. BMP 9 recommends that North Dakota State Seed Department 
publicize its “already-established process for providing input.” BMP 11 
says that NDSU must strictly isolate transgenic crops during planting 
and handling. And BMP 13 states that NDSU Extension will develop 
an educational brochure and website to provide “unbiased” information 
about how biotech, nonbiotech, and organic crops are produced. BMP 
10 tacitly addresses identity-preserved producers and organic farmers: 
“If there is a concern of unintended presence [of transgenic seed in cer-
tifi ed organic seed], the purchaser should pre-plant test the seed.”
Only two of the BMPs have minority opinions, BMP 1 and BMP 
8, both of which had a vote tally of 9-8. These two BMPs address the 
third and fourth standards for release directly. In both cases the minor-
ity opinion represents the position of organic farmers. BMP 1 has to do 
with determining liability of “researchers and developers” when “regu-
lated materials” (GM seeds) mix with non-GM seeds, a grave concern 
for identity-preserved and organic farmers. The majority opinion defers 
responsibility, saying only, “Researchers and developers of regulated 
genetic material must follow the established federal and state regula-
tions as minimum standards to maintain purity and identity.” Similarly, 
BMP 8, which explores standards of purity needed for certifying non-
GM seed, is of concern to organic farmers. Once again the majority 
opinion defers responsibility, recommending, as we have seen, “that 
the North Dakota State Seed Department not develop seed certifi cation 
standards for the presence of nontransgenic seed.” In the fi rst case, the 
majority protects GM researchers and developers by suggesting that 
they need only follow regulations; in the second, the majority protects 
the same constituency by resisting the move to establish standards of 
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purity, arguing that the “market place determines thresholds and stand-
ards for seed and product quality characteristics.” 
Conversely, the minority opinions in both cases attempt to establish 
higher standards. In response to BMP 1, the minority opinion argues, 
“protocols and regulations in place may not be adequate to provide con-
tainment,” and, “Conducting open-air research without the ability to 
verify the adequacy of their protocols is not sound science nor is it de-
fensible in the face of liability.” In response to BMP 8, the minority ar-
gues that there is “little hope of avoiding or minimizing the occurrence 
of GM traits” in organic crops unless standards are set and enforced. 
They claim that transgenic wheat genetic drift would be comparable to 
what occurred with pedigreed canola seed in Canada, where, they say, 
canola is “cross-contaminated at a high level.” 
The conclusion of this document tacitly acknowledges that consen-
sus was not achieved, saying, “We must remember that coexistence is a 
journey, not a destination.” When I interviewed Janet Jacobson a cou-
ple months after the document was published, she had not yet seen it 
and was surprised to learn that her name, along with the names of the 
others who had withdrawn from the working group, appeared on it. She 
was also surprised to learn that Monsanto had helped fund the working 
group. Although none of the people I talked with said so, this failure left 
standards three and four for release unsatisfi ed and probably contribut-
ed to Monsanto’s decision to withdraw transgenic wheat.
3. Potential Roles for the Technical Communicator as 
Interpreter of Technology
Retrospectively, I see ways that technical communicators with socio-
political awareness could have entered into the mediation process as 
negotiators of technology. Traditionally, the practice of technical com-
munication has been defi ned as the process of “bridging” between high-
er levels of technical knowledge and lower levels. Technical commu-
nicators, in other words, are translators of technical knowledge, and 
traditionally, the fl ow of knowledge has been unidirectional, from the 
expert producer to the novice user. In this role, the professional com-
municator who is employed by an agency that produces scientifi c and 
technical knowledge and products (as is the case with Monsanto and 
Roughrider Genetics) is something like a popularizer of science. Com-
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municators in the extension services usually fi ll a role of this kind: they 
are charged with making knowledge accessible in an objective manner 
(Koch 2004). To be recognized within the organization as an effective 
communicator, the writer needs to identify with the organization she 
represents and “adopt the position of one who speaks on behalf of those 
she represents” (Sullivan, Martin, Anderson 2003). When the agency 
paying the salary is an agency that develops scientifi c and technologi-
cal innovations, “making science accessible in an objective manner” 
has strong public-relations and marketing overtones. The unstated ob-
jective is to encourage adoption rather than mediation and accommoda-
tion (Fahnestock 1986; Dobrin 2004). Translating complex knowledge 
into simplifi ed versions and publishing that information in accessible 
materials is one way to facilitate adoption. 
Materials produced by NDSU Extension Service are good examples 
of documents that translate scientifi c knowledge into simpler, more ac-
cessible form, and, in so doing, perform public relations and market-
ing functions. The brochure titled Bringing New Technologies to Wheat 
spells out the standards for release of GM wheat, as we have already 
seen, but it also attempts to preempt possible objections by giving re-
assurance that GM wheat will not become an uncontrollable weed, that 
market strategies will be developed, that breeding programs will im-
prove competitiveness by working with Monsanto, and that Roundup 
Ready wheat will bring value to wheat growers. Another brochure, Ag-
riculture Biotechnology: What are the Issues?, provides answers to the 
following questions:
• What is biotechnology, and why is it being used in our food sup-
ply?
• What is genetic engineering?
• How long has genetic engineering been used in agriculture and food 
production?
• What are the goals and potential benefi ts of agricultural biotechnol-
ogy?
• Are there potential risks associated with agricultural biotechnolo-
gy?
• Which foods might contain ingredients made from genetically engi-
neered plants?
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• How can consumers be sure that biotech foods are safe to eat?
• What about dairy and meat products?
• Why aren't biotech foods labeled? 
• What if I don't want to eat foods made with biotech ingredients?
• What other products are genetically engineered?
• What are the effects of agricultural biotechnology on the environ-
ment? 
The answers impart real information and acknowledge certain concerns, 
but they are clearly written from a perspective that supports GM devel-
opment. The answers, combined with images of wholesome food and 
smiling faces, have a calming effect, alleviating fears and concerns.
The technical communicator as translator of knowledge may work in 
routine production, as an in-service worker, or even as a “symbolic-an-
alytic worker.” As Johndan Johnson-Eilola explains, Robert Reich de-
scribed these as three areas of service work, and they represent a hierar-
chy of worker responsibility and status. I agree with Johnson-Eilola that 
a technical communicator who works at the level of a symbolic-analyst 
is doing challenging and important work, integrating “communication 
into a much broader range of technological contexts” than the typical 
technical writer (2004). The process of integration may indeed entail 
mediation of technology and mediation among stakeholders. However, 
the symbolic analyst could still think of herself as a translator, and if she 
does, she will attempt to preserve meaning when subject matter crosses 
boundaries (whether those boundaries are associated with language or 
conceptual complexity), and in so doing align herself with the produc-
ers or originators of innovation. As Slack, Miller, and Doak put it, the 
effort to translate knowledge is always an attempt to “ensure . . . the 
preferred meanings are the ones that get fi xed” (2004). Even when the 
translator of knowledge attempts to fully understand the context of the 
reader and to incorporate the new information within reader's existing 
meaning structures, her goal is to fi x meanings by offering an interpre-
tation that recontextualizes and integrates preferred meanings. 
40
3.1. The Technical Communicator as Mediator of 
Technology
If we broaden the technical communicator’s role to include the task of 
mediating science and technology, we redefi ne the goal associated with 
her role and problematize the communicator’s allegiance. I am imagin-
ing a role for technical communicators as mediators of technology, peo-
ple who seek to mediate stakeholders’ concerns and to modify the tech-
nology so that it embodies integrated technical meanings and power re-
lationships. This is a role similar to the one envisioned by Slack, Miller 
and Doak when they suggest that technical communicators should think 
of their work as articulation instead of translation. Whereas a translator 
mediates only meaning, one who attempts to articulate meaning chal-
lenges existing articulations of power among sender, translator, and re-
ceiver. 
Yet I am thinking of more than a writer reconstructing texts to re-
fl ect re-articluated power relations; instead, I am thinking of people ac-
tively involved in creating forums and facilitating meetings, as well as 
composing documents. In this role, the technical communicator creates 
the conditions for new contexts of understanding to emerge and invites 
those who hold opposing interpretations to enter into the process of cre-
ating that new context and meaning. As Robert Johnson suggests, in-
stead of thinking of the audience as a targeted or invoked reader, we can 
strive to create an “involved” audience: “the involved audience brings 
the audience literally into the open, making the intended audience a vis-
ible, physical, collaborative presence” (2004). When technical commu-
nicators adopt this role, they are usually consultants, brought in from 
the outside to facilitate group work and to oversee the writing of docu-
ments. Julie Hile describes her experience in this role when she worked 
with several constituents from BNP railroad to rewrite the safety man-
ual. Instead of interviewing people and then retreating to rewrite the 
manual in private, she and her co-workers gathered some eighty peo-
ple from the company for an all-day writing session. These people in-
cluded safety professionals, leaders from four different unions, veteran 
railroaders, and rookies (Hile 2001). By encouraging discussion and 
suggesting an alternative way of looking at the safety rules, a novel 
perspective that offered space to create common ground, Hile was able 
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to help constituents reach consensus and draft their own revised safety 
manual.
4. Conclusion
As Hile’s experience demonstrates, technical communicators who fa-
cilitate negotiation and mediation do not align themselves with the 
originators of innovation, and they do not necessarily reinforce existing 
power and authority relations. Someone like Hile could have been help-
ful with the coexistence group discussed earlier. Although Gary Gore-
ham, a professor of sociology who served as facilitator of the group, 
had extensive experience mediating small group discussions, he did not 
come as a completely non-aligned person. Having done extensive soci-
ological research into the reasons people gave as to why they supported 
or didn’t support GM development, he already had a pre-existing inter-
pretive stance. Furthermore, as a tenured faculty member at NDSU, he 
might be suspected of aligning with NDSU, a school which cultivates 
partnerships with large seed companies.  A professional technical com-
municator with expertise in articulating meaning and facilitating nego-
tiations would be unaligned, unbiased, and unconcerned about future 
repercussions. 
I am not claiming that there are no pitfalls associated with this sce-
nario; the North Dakota wheat case teaches several lessons. 
• The technical communicator/mediator must be non-aligned and 
must do extensive homework before negotiations begin, exploring 
both sides of the issue and learning about the participants. A lack of 
understanding the issues and stakeholders, especially in an issue as 
complex and controversial as the GM wheat issue, could severely 
weaken her ability to facilitate negotiations. 
• The funding for hiring this person should come from a non-aligned 
source and not from stakeholders like Monsanto, NDSU, S.A.R.E. 
or NPSAS. Every funding agency involved in this case had a dis-
cernible stake in the outcome, and the use of funds from these or-
ganizations inevitably exerted infl uence.
• The working group needs to have representatives from all stake-
holders. In the case of the coexistence working group, only devel-
opers (Monsanto and NDSU) and producers (various kinds of farm-
42
ers) were represented. No consumer or environmental groups were 
represented, and yet these groups would eventually weigh in on the 
subject, so they should have been brought in to the negotiations ear-
ly on. Had such representatives been present, the BMPs that came 
from the group may have been entirely different. 
• Participants need to be chosen based on their legitimacy as repre-
sentatives for their constituencies and on the condition they to stick 
with the process to the end. Penalties associated with non-participa-
tion, or at least clear statements of what will happen if a participant 
fails to participate, need to be spelled out. 
• The authority of the group and the rules for participation need to 
be clearly defi ned and enforced. Although the coexistence working 
group did establish rules for conducting business, the fi nal publica-
tion disavows the authority of the group, claiming that the BMPs are 
not meant to be the basis for legislative action. 
• If true mediation is sought, then rules need to insist that consen-
sus be reached so that no published statements can come out with-
out unanimous support. Although this requirement sounds severe, it 
forces the mediators to modify the technology rather than to ignore 
the concerns of minority stakeholders. Without this rule the most 
powerful are likely to have their way in the group and to run rough-
shod over the weaker.
Some readers will recognize in these recommendations an endorse-
ment of Habermas’s ideal speech situation (Roundy 1994), and so it is. 
What I have in mind is a forum in which “the actions of the agents in-
volved are coordinated not through ego-centric calculation of success 
but through acts of reaching understanding” (Habermas 1984: 285-6). 
Although Habermas’s ideal speech situation has been criticized for be-
ing utopian (Benhabib 1985), it offers a forum for negotiation in which 
technology itself is modifi ed to serve human needs and to protect the in-
terests of all parties and not just of those who control the capital. 
We take it for granted that technological innovation is a good thing 
and that it will be adopted locally if we make it easy to understand and 
use. However, as the case with GM wheat in North Dakota shows, not 
all scientifi c and technical innovation is widely accepted as benefi cial. 
In such cases, the task of the technical communicator needs to be more 
than that of an advocate for adoption who translates complex knowl-
43
edge into simple language. If technical communication is going to set 
itself apart from public relations and marketing, its practitioners need 
to seek ways of becoming mediators of technology, facilitating under-
standing, and creating opportunities for new interpretations and com-
mon ground to emerge.
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